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Abstract The creation of an International Criminal Court ~ICC! to prosecute war
crimes poses a real puzzle+ Why was it created, and more importantly, why do states
agree to join this institution? The ICC represents a serious intrusion into a traditional
arena of state sovereignty: the right to administer justice to one’s one nationals+ Yet
more than one hundred states have joined+ Social scientists are hardly of one mind
about this institution, arguing that it is ~alternately! dangerous or irrelevant to achiev-
ing its main purposes: justice, peace, and stability+ By contrast, we theorize that the
ICC is a mechanism to assist states in self-binding, and draw on credible commit-
ments theory to understand who commits to the ICC, and the early consequences of
such commitments+ This approach explains a counterintuitive ﬁnding: the states that
are both the least and the most vulnerable to the possibility of an ICC case affecting
their citizens have committed most readily to the ICC, while potentially vulnerable
states with credible alternative means to hold leaders accountable do not+ Similarly,
ratiﬁcation of the ICC is associated with tentative steps toward violence reduction
and peace in those countries precisely least likely to be able to commit credibly to
foreswear atrocities+ These ﬁndings support the potential usefulness of the ICC as a
mechanism for some governments to commit to ratchet down violence and get on
the road to peaceful negotiations+
On 2 February 1999, Senegal became the ﬁrst country to ratify the Rome Statute,
the treaty creating the International Criminal Court ~ICC or Court!+ Just eight years
later—despite opposition from several major actors, including the United States,
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eign states in the world embraced this independent international institution dedi-
cated to prosecuting some of the most serious crimes known to humanity+
International agreements deﬁning the crimes of genocide and war crimes have
existed for decades, but these prohibitions have been drastically underenforced+
The development of the ICC represents a stunning change of course+ Not only
does the ICC promise more stringent enforcement of international crimes, it also
takes away from sovereign states the discretion to decide when to initiate
prosecutions—a right they have heretofore jealously guarded+ Indeed, the deci-
sion by some national leaders to join the Court seems potentially to run against
their self-interest, since it is widely assumed the ICC will focus on prosecutions
of high-level ﬁgures in countries where mass atrocities occur+
Thus far, few social scientists have given this innovative institution close scru-
tiny+1 Those who have are often skeptical of its ability to deter international crimes
and encourage peace and stability+ Snyder and Vinjamuri argue that institutions
bent on doling out universal justice are likely to cause more harm than good+2
Gilligan offers a formal model that shows this is not necessarily true, however,
and shows that an institution such as the ICC might theoretically be able to deter
some atrocities “on the margins+”3 International lawyers are characteristically
~though not uniformly! more optimistic+ On the one hand, those such as Scheffer
or Akhavan who have had close involvement with such tribunals are likely to
attribute deterrent properties to them+4 By contrast, more removed legal scholars
such as Ku and Nzelibe argue that international criminal tribunals are hardly likely
to deter crimes by government opponents, whose calculations are overwhelmingly
more likely to be inﬂuenced by harsh local sanctions than by lighter and less likely
international ones+5 Optimists are likely to view international criminal tribunals as
important inﬂuences on domestic values and cultural orientations toward vio-
lence;6 pessimists ~more plentiful among international relations scholars and increas-
ingly vocal in the legal academy!7 remain largely unconvinced of such tribunals’
transformative potential+8
The establishment of and adherence to the ICC is therefore a real conundrum+ It
was established by governments, but it is not clearly in any given government’s
interest+9 Some American observers believe the ICC is dangerous—both to U+S+
1+ Exceptions include Fehl 2004, as well as the literature discussed below+
2+ Snyder and Vinjamuri 200302004+ For a contrary view, arguing that the ICC in fact sets param-
eters in which political settlements can take place, see Méndez 2001+
3+ Gilligan 2006+
4+ See Akhavan 2001; and Scheffer 2002+
5+ Ku and Nzelibe 2006+
6+ Kiss 2000+
7+ Goldsmith 2003+
8+ Bloxham 2006+
9+ For a “supply side” argument explaining why major powers such as the United Kingdom wanted
to create an ICC in the 1990s, see Katzenstein 2009+ She argues that these powers wanted to avoid
226 International Organizationinterests and to the cause of international peace and security more generally+ Many
more view the institution as irrelevant to the regions of the world it was intended
to affect—those recently rent by violent civil conﬂict+ The most puzzling aspect
of the Court is why so many governments have accepted its jurisdiction over a
range of atrocities+ The delegation of real prosecutorial authority is truly anoma-
lous and hard to explain if the ICC is merely a symbolic gesture toward “justice+”
We argue that the ICC can be understood through the lens of credible commitment
theory,10 which provides a mechanism for understanding why states would agree
to bind their own hands by forswearing certain violent options+ This explanation
also suggests that under certain circumstances an ICC commitment can contribute
to an atmosphere conducive to conﬂict reduction and peaceful negotiation+
The insights of credible commitment theory explain an interesting but counter-
intuitive empirical regularity: all else equal, unaccountable autocracies that have
endured recent internal conﬂict have decided to cooperate with the ICC in surpris-
ing numbers+ In fact, other factors being equal, unaccountable autocracies are more
likely to commit themselves to the Court than are democratic countries with a
recent history of such conﬂicts+ In contrast to theories that invest democracies in a
blanket fashion with strong preferences for international law and cooperation,11 or
theories that attribute international legal commitments to the diffusion of a world
culture that currently promotes judicialization,12 this patterns suggests that some
governments rationally use the ICC to tie their hands as they make tentative steps
toward conﬂict resolution+ This perspective suggests that the ICC may begin to
have positive effects even before it prosecutes a single suspect+
This article is organized into four parts+ The ﬁrst provides a brief background
to the ICC and discusses the treaty’s institutional design+ It sets up the argument
by describing how the ICC is constituted to “tie the hands” of state parties when it
comes to the tactics they use to gain military advantages+ The second section
presents credible commitments theory, discusses how it relates to civil settings
and to the ICC, and generates a set of behavioral expectations consistent with the
theory’s claims+ The third section discusses the data and methods we use to test
our interpretation of the ICC as a rational tool governments use to tie their hands
under certain circumstances+ The fourth section tests the commitment patterns we
anticipate if indeed the ICC is playing the commitment role we describe+ The evi-
dence ﬁts a theory that the ICC is indeed useful for some governments credibly to
tie their hands to foreswear certain modes of violent conﬂict+ The conclusion con-
trasts this argument with alternative understandings of the Court as merely sym-
bolic, or worse, detrimental to the cause of peace and stability+ This case sheds
direct responsibility as “accountability police” and instead preferred to “outsource” this function to an
independent court+
10+ Fearon 1997+
11+ See Dixon 1994; and Ho 2002+
12+ On the idea of world culture as an explanation for much nation-state isomorphism, see Meyer
et al+ 1997
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ingly playing in facilitating cooperation and conﬂict resolution even in highly
conﬂictive settings+
The International Criminal Court in Historical and
Institutional Perspective
Background
The twentieth century has been a remarkable period of international “judicializa-
tion+” International courts and courtlike institutions have sprouted in surprising
numbers to deal with speciﬁc functional problems, such as conﬂict over trade agree-
ments or disagreements over the application of the Law of the Seas, and regional
concerns such as individual human rights+ The ICC is different from nearly all of
these institutions+ It is one of the few devoted to the enforcement of international
criminal law, holding individuals accountable for violations with the potential to
imprison for life persons convicted of such crimes+ The ICC involves the potential
transference to an international institution one of the most coveted aspects of state
sovereignty: the right to administer justice within a state’s territory+
The use of international criminal tribunals fell into desuetude during the Cold
War, but the 1990s proved a propitious time to resurrect the idea+ The end of the
Cold War had reinvigorated the search for multilateral solutions to transnational
problems, and establishing courts became a popular strategy+13 The global stabil-
ity maintained for forty years by the United States and the Soviet Union had begun
to crumble, leading to especially cruel civil wars in many regions of the world+
No one had an effective solution to quell these internal conﬂicts in the post–
Cold War setting+ But there was a growing sense, nurtured by nongovernmental
human rights and humanitarian organizations, that impunity for crimes against
humanity and genocide was hardly acceptable+ In Yugoslavia and then Rwanda, a
United Nations that could do little to stop the atrocities decided to establish ad
hoc courts to punish the perpetrators+ These tribunals formed a key precedent for
the creation of the International Criminal Court+14 They illustrated that inter-
national criminal courts could function outside of the post–World War II setting
and exposed the weaknesses of relying on the politicized UN Security Council for
their creation+
Despite ~or more likely because of! their weaknesses, the experience of these
ad hoc arrangements energized human rights activists around the world to push
13+ On the development of international law and judicial institutions over the past few decades, see
Abbott and Snidal 2000; Abbott et al+ 2000; and Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000+
14+ This evolution is described further in Danner 2006+ On the lessons of the ICTY for the ICC, see
Tochilovsky 2003+
228 International Organizationfor a permanent institution devoted to international criminal justice+15 The civil
wars of the 1990s convinced activists and many government leaders that a stand-
ing Court with the ability to prosecute high ofﬁcials—even national leaders—was
a way to deter serious crimes and to contribute to peace+16 The international crim-
inal regime was eventually designed such that this function would be carried out
through national institutions where possible17 and the ICC where necessary+
The ICC as an Institutional Innovation
The primary innovation of the ICC is its institutional capacity to pre-commit states—
with few available loopholes—to cooperate with its criminal prosecutions for spe-
ciﬁc crimes+ The Court has jurisdiction over all potential cases of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes that occur after 1 July 2002 in the territory of a
state that has ratiﬁed the treaty or that are committed by a national of such a state+18
Unlike the traditional model exempliﬁed by the International Court of Justice, the
treaty creating the ICC does not allow states to decide whether or not to accept
the Court’s jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis+19 Furthermore, unlike the original
draft treaty for the Court,20 the Rome Statute invests a prosecutor with the ability
to commence cases on her or his own initiative without relying solely on the refer-
rals of states+21 The result is a Court much more independent of state control in
the initiation of cases and far less protective of state sovereignty than was origi-
nally contemplated or has ever existed in modern history+
Other aspects of the Rome Statute also serve to tie ofﬁcials’ hands by increas-
ing the likelihood of ICC prosecution for crimes within its jurisdiction+ The Rome
Statute does not allow states to make reservations to its provisions+22 Adherence is
15+ On the course of negotiations and the inﬂuence of activists and NGOs, see Glasius 2006; Lee
1999; and Pace and Schense 2002+
16+ See, for example, the Statement of Norway, 12 November 2001, available at ^http:00www+
iccnow+org0documents0Norway6thComm12Nov01+pdf&+ Accessed 8 January 2010+
17+ The preamble to the ICC treaty highlights this point by “recalling that it is the duty of every
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes+” Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc+ A0CONF+18309 ~1998!@ hereinafter
Rome Statute#+
18+ Rome Statute, Article 12~2!+ A state may also accept the jurisdiction of the Court on an ad hoc
basis with regard to that particular situation+ Rome Statute, Article 12~3!+ In addition, the Court has
jurisdiction over any case referred to it by the United Nations Security Council under its Chapter VII
authority, whether or not the state where the alleged crimes occurred has ratiﬁed the treaty+
19+ Lee 1999, 28
20+ Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, in Report of the International Law Commis-
sion on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, UN GAOR, 49th Sess+, Supp+ No+ 10, at 43–45 ~Article
23 and 25!, UN Doc+A049010 ~1994!, reprinted in @1994# 2Y +B+ Int’l L+ Comm’n 46, UN Doc+A0CN+40
Ser+A019940Add+1 ~Part 2!+
21+ Danner 2003, 513–15+ While frivolous or politically motivated prosecutions are a possibility
~and one that has particularly concerned the United States!, the Rome Statute has checks built into it to
discourage a prosecutor from acting irresponsibly+ These are described further in Danner 2003+
22+ Rome Statute, Article 120+
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nities traditionally accorded to heads of state and other senior ofﬁcials under inter-
national law+ In fact the treaty overrides any immunities that states may grant to
presidential, parliamentary, or legislative ofﬁcials in their domestic systems+24 More-
over, the prosecutor has given every indication that he or she will in fact focus on
high-level offenders25—a threat each government has to weigh when deciding
whether to ratify the statute+
Given these far-reaching provisions, the challenge for the drafters of the Rome
Statute was how to encourage any state to join the International Criminal Court+
The answer lies in the principle of complementarity: the ICC is meant to
supplement—not supplant—domestic criminal law prosecutions+ In the Rome
Statute’s complementarity regime, states with domestic jurisdiction over the crime
must ﬁrst have the option of investigating the case domestically before the ICC
can adjudicate it+26 As the Court’s ﬁrst prosecutor has stated, “intervention by the
ICC must be exceptional—it will only step in when states fail to genuinely act+”27
No state party’s ofﬁcials can be absolutely sure, however, that complementarity
will protect them or their citizens from the Court’s jurisdiction+ The Court’s judges
may ﬁnd a case “admissible” in the Court despite a domestic investigation or pros-
ecution if the Court determines that “the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution+”28 Sudan’s desultory investigations and
prosecutions of crimes committed in Darfur provide a clear example of the kind
of behavior the admissibility provisions were designed to override+29
Finally, the structure of the Rome Statute does not allow governments to refer
cases to the Court involving rebel groups without running the risk that the Court
will also prosecute government ofﬁcials+ The drafters of the Rome Statute were
careful to draft language into the treaty that allows states to refer “situations” to
23+ The treaty does ofﬁcially allow countries to decline to recognize the Court’s jurisdiction for
seven years after the state becomes a party to the treaty+ Rome Statute, Article 124+ Thus far, only
France ~who insisted on this provision in the treaty negotiations! and Colombia have entered the requi-
site declaration+
24+ Rome Statute, Article 27+
25+ According to the Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce, they “will initiate prosecutions of the leaders who bear
most responsibility for the crimes+” Quoted “Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Prosecutor,”
Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, September 2003, 3+Available at ^http:00www+icc-
cpi+int0NR0rdonlyres04780FCDE-7428-455A-BE01-E3BEE06920B402484620372619+pdf&, accessed
8 January 2010+
26+ See Rome Statute, Preamble ~emphasizing that the ICC “shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions”!+
27+ “A Global Web of Justice is Up and Running,” International Herald Tribune ~Internet ed+!, 12
June 2006, available at ^http:00www+iht+com0articles020060060110opinion0edocampo+php&+ Accessed
8 January 2010+
28+ Rome Statute, Article 17~1!~a!+
29+ See Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, “Third Report of the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court, Mr+ Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the UN Security Council Pursuant to
UNSCR 1593 ~2005!,” 14 June 2006, available at ^http:00www+issafrica+org0AF0proﬁles0sudan0darfur0
iccunscjun05+pdf&+ Accessed 8 January 2010+
230 International Organizationthe Court ~covering the entire course of a conﬂict! instead of allowing them to
limit their referrals to individual cases of wrongdoing+30 When Uganda referred
crimes committed by the rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army, to the ICC, the
prosecutor was quick to highlight that he would investigate all crimes in Northern
Uganda, implicitly including crimes allegedly committed by government forces+31
While governments may try and use the Court opportunistically, it was designed
speciﬁcally to prevent them from insulating themselves from review+
Of course, none of these provisions guarantee that perpetrators of atrocities will
be punished+ There are many ways in which governments and other actors could
try to subvert the work of the Court and loosen their self-chosen “constraints+”A s
we have seen in the cases of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ~ICTR!
and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ~ICTY!, govern-
ments can interfere with prosecutions by strategically withholding evidence, inter-
fering with investigations, and denying passports or visas to witnesses+32 As the
examples of Serbia’s Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic demonstrate, alleged per-
petrators can evade a tribunal for years, making it difﬁcult for them to be brought
to justice+ It is also possible that a prosecutor could elect to forego prosecution+While
prosecution is not a certainty, the existence of the Court signiﬁcantly raises the
expected costs of committing atrocities compared to the status quo of impunity+Any
state that becomes a party to the ICC must allow for the very real possibility that if
the government is responsible for atrocities, its most senior ﬁgures could be pros-
ecuted either at home or in this Court—or pay a steep cost to avoid it+33
The ICC and Credible Commitment Theory
Why would governments ever agree to cooperate with an institution such as the
ICC? There are two easy answers+ The ﬁrst is that governments anticipate they
will never be in a situation in which their nationals will be subject to its jurisdic-
tion+ That might explain the enthusiasm of many of its more peaceful supporters,
such as the Scandinavian countries, and this is indeed the calculation of many
countries+ The second easy answer is that governments expect to be able to use
the ICC to legitimate the prosecution of their political opponents+ While this expla-
nation may be partially true, it cannot be the whole story+ First, governments are
just as vulnerable to the Court’s jurisdiction as are rebels+ Second, governments
30+ Rome Statute, Article 14+
31+ Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, “Statement by the Prosecutor Related to
Crimes Committed in Barlonya Camp in Uganda” ~23 February 2004!+
32+ Peskin 2008+
33+ Serbia, for example, has suffered strong ﬁnancial penalties for its failure to hand over individ-
uals indicted by the ICTY+ See “A Serbian Region Unravels with its Textile Industry,” New York Times
~Internet ed+!, 29 January 2007+ available at ^http:00www+nytimes+com020070010290world0europe0
29serbia+html?_r1&orefslogin&+ Accessed 8 January 2010+
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this purpose+ The problem may be that domestic institutions may not be perceived
as fair+ If so, rebels are likely to resist both arrest and concessions and violence is
likely to continue unabated+ Thus, we advance a new interpretation of the ICC as
a device to make governments’ commitment to reduce civil violence credible by
tying their own hands not only to prosecute fairly but potentially to be prosecuted
as well+
The Theory of Credible Commitments
The central insight of credible commitment theory is that in many cases, actors
have difﬁculty reaching cooperative solutions in their mutual relationships because
they are unable to commit themselves credibly in advance to act in agreed or
speciﬁed ways+34 There are a number of reasons one actor’s promise to behave
cooperatively might not be believed by others+ One is the problem of cynical
commitments: promises may be made by actors with no intention of living up to
them+ Another common problem arises from time-inconsistent preferences+ An
actor may sincerely want to promise to behave cooperatively in the present, but
in the future it may be rational to renege opportunistically+ Where threats, prom-
ises, or agreements cannot be enforced, actors ﬁnd it difﬁcult to convince one
another they will behave in ways that may appear costly in the short term, even
if to do so might produce greater beneﬁts for the actor~s! concerned+35
What are the options for actors that want to enjoy the joint gains that may be
possible from being able to commit to a particular course of action? Credible com-
mitments theory emphasizes the need to raise the cost of defection ex post+ Sur-
rendering some sort of bond held by a third party in case of defection is one
possibility ~common in economic transactions!+ Another is to empower an indepen-
dent third party to make and carry out policy decisions that effectively remove the
decision from the credibility-challenged actor’s authority ~common in the imple-
mentation of monetary policy!+
The problem is of course that sovereign states can hardly irrevocably tie their
hands in the ways described here+ More often the strategy is to make reneging on
an agreement costly by raising the political costs of defection+ Fearon has referred
to “audience costs” as the generic set of political costs a government might face if
it reneges on a commitment+36 Theoretically, audience costs can arise from the
34+ For a discussion of commitment theory and domestic constitutions, see, for example, Elster
1979; Fearon 1997; and Holmes 1988+ Credible commitment devices abound in international politics,
from investment treaties with independent dispute-resolution mechanisms ~Elkins, Guzman, and Sim-
mons 2006! to exchange rate pegs ~Bernhard, Broz, and Clark 2002, 706! to the international law
doctrine of uti possidetis for territorial limitation ~Ratner 2003!+
35+ Powerful actors can, paradoxically, be harmed by playing their dominant strategy+ See Maoz
and Felsenthal 1987+
36+ Fearon 1997, 70+
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support, aid, economic cooperation! on an actor who defects+ Sovereign states may
rationally try to raise their anticipated audience costs associated with defection if
they want to make their commitments more credible in the ﬁrst place+ Credibility
can be enhanced by deliberately making the noncooperative alternatives more costly+
Hands-tying in the way we have described is itself a costly option to pursue,
which helps to reinforce the credibility of the commitment being made+ Every effort
by a state to tie hands practically by deﬁnition involves foregoing certain policy
options+ “Sovereignty costs” are the costs of giving up decision-making auton-
omy+ The greater the sovereignty costs relative to the expected gain from making
a credible commitment the less likely a government is to engage in hand tying+
But where the potential gains of making a credible commitment are high, con-
cerns about sovereignty costs will be overridden and a strategy of hand-tying is
rational+
Applying Hand-Tying Theory to the ICC
Credible commitment theory can proﬁtably be used to understand the stance of
sovereign governments vis-à-vis the ICC+ First, there is a good ﬁt between the
issues the ICC was meant to address and the theory of hand-tying+ The problem of
making credible commitments is rife in civil war settings, where governments can
hardly be trusted to self-limit their resort to arms, if to do so would provide an
important military advantage+ Walter’s research, for example, has found that one
of the most signiﬁcant hurdles in reaching a negotiated settlement to civil war is
the problem of designing credible agreements on the terms of the peace agree-
ment, “a task made difﬁcult without credible outside assistance+”37
Similarly, credible commitments circumscribing war-ﬁghting practices are dif-
ﬁcult to make, especially in civil war settings+ States’ agents ~as well as their
military opponents! regularly resort to tactics that recklessly endanger civilians,
wantonly mistreat prisoners, and violently persecute opposition groups, despite
legal prohibitions to the contrary+38 The problem with most legal attempts to pre-
vent such atrocities is that this violence may be “useful” in the short run; by
demoralizing prisoners or the opposition’s civilians it may be possible to coerce
cooperation or reduce active resistance+39 From a government’s long-term per-
spective, however, the commission of such atrocities can have disastrous conse-
quences+ Atrocities can fuel mistrust among victim groups and render a stable
peace harder to negotiate+ The perpetration of atrocities tends to make it harder
37+ Walter 1999, 129+ See also Posen’s analysis of the security dilemma in civil war settings ~Posen
1993!+ The unavailability of an enforceable contract is also central to Wagner’s analysis of inter-
national wars+ See Wagner 2000, 480+
38+ Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006+
39+ Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004, 376+ They note that “intentional killing of civilians is
often a calculated military strategy designed to combat powerful guerilla insurgencies+”
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court 233to form cooperative coalitions with an interest in dispute settlement+ It may also
imperil the government’s survival+40 Governments may therefore have motives to
end the cycle of civil violence, but they may have no way to make a promise to
do so that any opposition group or even the general public will believe will last
longer than the next security threat+ The problem of time-inconsistent prefer-
ences is often quite real+41
The ICC offers a solution by raising the government’s expected ex post costs of
reneging+ Joining the ICC greatly enhances the risk for states of future punish-
ment of their senior leaders, at least by comparison to a regime of impunity+ This
exposure to prosecution by an independent international institution acts as an
implicit promise by governments that they will foreswear particularly heinous mil-
itary options, and it endows that promise with a credibility that such governments
would otherwise lack+
What kinds of ex post costs might a government face for reneging? Legally,
ratiﬁcation of the ICC statute42 is a commitment made formally to the inter-
national community+ As such it can trigger a potentially costly investigation, pros-
ecution, and punishment of government ofﬁcials or agents+ But ratiﬁcation also
involves domestic audience costs by raising expectations among the general pop-
ulace weary of violence that the government is committed to diffusing the conﬂict
and seeking peaceful solutions+ The frustration of these expectations by the com-
mission of atrocities is likely to cost the government popular support+ Thus we
believe that the most important audience for this commitment in a society torn by
civil war and at risk of mass atrocities is, in fact, domestic+ The willingness of a
government to subject itself to the risk of prosecution sends an important signal to
a government’s adversaries as well as the broader public that there are boundaries
in quelling future threats beyond which the government will not go+ The fact that
a government cannot at low cost rescind or reverse this commitment reasonably
enhances the perception that this government is interested in ratcheting down the
violence and moving toward a peaceful solution to the conﬂict+ Joining the ICC is
therefore a form of self-binding commitment, in which states attempt to persuade
other players—rebels, potentially supportive publics—that the government has vol-
untarily abandoned the option of engaging in unlimited violence, thus creating
incentives for other actors to alter their behavior as well+43
All serious efforts to tie hands involve sovereignty costs, and this fact helps to
anticipate which countries will support the Court and which will be resistant+ Cred-
ible commitment theory expects states to ratify that will gain disproportionately
40+ Carr ~2003, 12! argues that “the nation or faction that resorts to warfare against civilians most
quickly, most often, and most viciously is the nation or faction most likely to see its interests frustrated
and, in many cases, its existence terminated+”
41+ Mégret ~2005, xi, 32! theorizes commitment to the ICC as an “international anchoring of an
inter-temporal commitment+”
42+ We refer to “ratiﬁcation” to include both ratiﬁcation and accession+
43+ This is very similar to the deﬁnition of self-binding offered by Maoz and Felsenthal 1987, 187+
234 International Organizationfrom the act of hand-tying: those with a recent history of civil wars, but weak
domestic institutions of accountability+44 Examples of such states in 2010 include
Afghanistan, Peru, and the Democratic Republic of Congo+ There is much less
motive to delegate—and pay the sovereignty costs45 that ratifying the ICC implies—
where national mechanisms can credibly hold ofﬁcials accountable+ States that can
credibly expose and prosecute misdeeds in their domestic institutions will try to
do so without surrendering sovereignty to an external institution+ Our approach
suggests that states with a recent history of violence but relatively good domestic
accountability mechanisms should tend to hold the ICC at arm’s length+ Countries
making this calculation may include Bangladesh, India, and Indonesia who have
recently experienced turbulent and sometimes violent internal conﬂicts+ It could
also potentially explain opposition of the United States, were the Court to focus
its efforts on international rather than civil wars+
Credible commitment theory does not make strong predictions about the atti-
tudes of states without civil wars in their recent past+ These states are not likely to
need the Court’s war-crime-focused jurisdiction for credibility purposes+ But a state
with high accountability and low violence has a double protection against the juris-
diction of the Court: acts within the Court’s jurisdiction are unlikely to be com-
mitted and if they are, the complementarity principle is almost certain to prevent
the Court from launching an investigation+ For this group of countries, coopera-
tion with the ICC is simply not likely to be very costly+ These governments can
decide to support the Court—if at all—without concern for incursions into their
sovereignty, since the likelihood of prosecution is anticipated to be effectively zero+
They can make their decision to cooperate on other grounds, for example, on their
assessment of the Court’s ability to deter crimes elsewhere+ These states may very
well be sincere in their expectation that, in the words of the Norwegian delega-
tion, the ICC will “provide the international community long term peace making
dividends+”46 Keep in mind, however, that they make this assessment knowing
that the chances they will ever surrender a national to this institution are effec-
tively zero+
The ﬁnal category of states about which our theory does not make strong pre-
dictions is peaceful but unaccountable autocracies+ There is no obvious reason for
this group to worry about their credibility when it comes to the commission of
ICC crimes, since they are unlikely to have committed any ~which is not to say
44+ On the substitution of international institutions for weak or nonexistent domestic institutions
see Simmons and Martin 2002, 747–49
45+ The term “sovereignty costs” is used here and elsewhere in the literature to refer to the costs
that a state incurs by delegating a function ordinarily performed domestically to an international insti-
tution over which it has little, if any, control+ See Abbott and Snidal 2000+ Bradley and Kelley ~2008,
19! argue that “sovereignty costs are higher for subjects that have traditionally been regulated by the
state, such as criminal law and punishment+”
46+ Excerpts from the 6th Committee Discussion of Item 164: Establishment of the International
Criminal Court, 56th Assembly of the United Nations, 12–13 November 2001+ Available at ^http:00
coalitionfortheicc+org0documents0Norway6thComm12Nov01+pdf&+
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court 235they have excellent human rights records!, but moreover, they have no motive to
tie their hands to reduce a cycle of domestic violence+ The ICC may be viewed as
largely irrelevant to them, and the decision to join will be driven by factors out-
side of our theory, many of which we test below+
A theory of hands tying leads us to a quite counterintuitive conclusion: the ICC
will ﬁnd its strongest support from a coalition of principled, highly accountable,
nonviolent states, and violent states with weak domestic accountability mecha-
nisms+ The Scandinavians and certainAfrican countries will both support the Court,
the former in the possible belief that it will in fact lead to peace and security in
troubled areas of the world; the latter because it solves a credibility deﬁcit that
makes it difﬁcult to begin to ratchet down local violence+ The Court will ﬁnd its
weakest support among countries engaged in recent violent conﬂicts, but with the
institutional capacity credibly to hold those who commit atrocities accountable for
their actions+
These predictions are quite distinct from other theoretical alternatives+ Demo-
cratic theorists might expect all democracies to favor an effective ICC, by virtue
of their afﬁnity for justice, the rule of law, or bounded norms of democratic com-
petition+47 Realists might expect all violent or powerful states to shun the ICC, on
the assumption that states will have no interest in forswearing any instruments of
coercion, regardless of their abhorrence+48 It is possible to design empirical tests
to compare the explanatory power of these approaches, which we do in the remain-
der of the article+
Data and Methods
Evidence on governments’ motive for joining the ICC is hard to come by+ For the
most part, the debates that led to the formation of the ICC were not made public,
and those public statements that states have made give very little insight into their
true motives for supporting and joining the Court+ Many of the countries of cen-
tral interest to our thesis—the authoritarian countries that have experienced recent
civil war—ratiﬁed the Rome statutes with hardly a trace of legislative debate or
justiﬁcation+ Qualitative research has turned up little other than bland statements
about supporting the Court for purposes of ending impunity, restoring justice,
enhancing stability, and establishing the rule of law+ In diplomatic circles govern-
ments have simply not been speciﬁc about who they expect the Court to prosecute
or exactly how or why they expect the Court to enhance peace and stability+ We
can draw few inferences of theoretical interest from government statements+ For
example, the delegate from Sierra Leone supported the Court, noting that “As a
47+ See, for example, Dixon 1994, 15–18+ By contrast, Goldsmith and Posner argue that cosmopol-
itan actions such as joining the ICC are not especially compatible with democratic governance+ See
Goldsmith and Posner 2005, 215–16
48+ For a realist perspective, see Mearsheimer 2001+
236 International Organizationcountry emerging from conﬂict, and one that has chosen accountability and the
restoration of the rule of law as the main vehicle to sustainable peace, we can
attest ﬁrst-hand to the crucial role of international criminal justice in ending con-
ﬂict and restoring public conﬁdence in the country and in its future+”49 Such a
statement is consistent with many theories of how the Court might work, includ-
ing the credible commitments approach we have developed here+
Similarly, the delegate from Lesotho declared during the debates that “respect
for the Rule of Law cannot be achieved unless those who perpetrate evil and cruelty
against other human beings are punished+ For this reason it became imperative for
us to create a fair and independent judicial body that would save future genera-
tions from the impending scourge of war+”50 Such statements reveal a conviction
that an independent source of justice is necessary to peace, but allows for the pos-
sibility that such institutions can operate both domestically and internationally+
~In addition to bolstering the independence of their judicial institutions over the
last few years, Lesotho was an early ratiﬁer of the Rome Statute+! Such generali-
ties are echoed in the words of the delegate from Yugoslavia: “My country has
supported the process leading to the establishment of a permanent International
Criminal Court, convinced that such an independent and universally accepted inter-
national legal body will in the most effective manner contribut@e# to the ensuring
of international peace and justice+”51 One can infer from this statement that the
speaker acknowledges that domestic processes are often less than effective, and
that the ICC can in these cases provide a more effective—because more credible—
substitute+ But in general, such statements provide few insights+ Most countries
who have supported the Court have made similar generalizations, but they reveal
very little about the way supporters expect the Court actually to operate+ Given
the aridity of the formal record, we have decided to analyze actions rather than
words+ Thus we will look instead to how states have behaved toward the Court,
and how its authority has cast an inﬂuence over the peace-making efforts of the
major actors in civil conﬂicts+
The Major Explanatory Variables: Civil War
and Accountability
Credible commitment theory suggests that states at risk for committing mass atroc-
ities should be among the ICC’s strongest supporters+ Just who are these states?
While the ICC is, as a legal matter, designed to address mass crimes that occur in
49+ Statement by Ambassador Allieu I+ Kanu, Head of Delegation of Sierra Leone, Fourth Session
of the Assembly of States Parties+
50+ Statement by His Excellency Mr+ Percy Metsing Mangoaela, Permanent Representative of Lesotho
to the United Nations, at the ﬁrst meeting of the Assembly of States Parties, 9 September 2002+
51+ Statement by H+ E+ Mr+ Dejan Sahovic, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Perma-
nent Representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, Preparatory Com-
mission for the International Criminal Court, 1 July 2002+
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court 237international armed conﬂicts, in civil wars, and during times of “peace,” the ICC
is most likely to prosecute crimes associated with civil wars,52 which tend to be
highly correlated with atrocities+53 We believe the states whose nationals are most
at risk of prosecution if they choose to join the Court are those with recent domes-
tic political violence+ Thus we will test the hypothesis that states who have been
involved in civil wars within the past ﬁve years are more likely to support the
Court, conditional on these states’ inability credibly to hold perpetrators account-
able via domestic institutions+54 We code whether the country had experienced a
civil war of any intensity during the post–Cold War years ~since 1990! and before
the Rome Statute was open for signature, with a minimum threshold of twenty-
ﬁve battle deaths per year+55
Our next problem is to capture low domestic accountability+ Note that prosecu-
tion is not the only way to hold leaders and their agents accountable+ Information
on government atrocities via a free press, competitive party systems through which
policies can be discussed and criticized, periodic elections by which the public
can assess the record of governance and decide whether to return a government to
power, as well as politically independent courts and military tribunals are all mech-
anisms through which government agents can be held accountable for the meth-
ods they have selected to prosecute wars or maintain security+ Without these kinds
of institutions, atrocities are more difﬁcult to bring to light, to assess, and to pun-
ish+ A reasonable measure of accountability is therefore the existence of demo-
cratic institutions, which as a whole are more effective than autocratic ones for
holding governments and their agents responsible for their actions+ To measure
democracy, we use the Freedom House measure of whether a country is “free,”
“partially free,” or “not free+” We consider the ﬁnal category to constitute govern-
ments least able to commit credibly to lower levels of violence in civil conﬂicts+
The Polity scale and the World Bank’s “rule of law” scale are used to demonstrate
the robustness of our ﬁndings+
52+ The events most responsible for the renaissance of international criminal law—the crimes in
Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda—occurred in the context of civil wars; the ICC’s actual ﬁrst
cases, those involving the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, CentralAfrican Republic, and Sudan,
also all involve civil wars; and much of the debate surrounding the ICC in fact centers on how it will
affect civil conﬂicts+ See, for example, Farer 2000+ We agree with Ku and Nzelibe, 2006, 780, who
argue that “for both legal and political reasons, ICT prosecutions will be directed almost exclusively at
individuals engaged in civil conﬂict+”
53+ Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004+ Table A1 indicates that twenty-seven of thirty epi-
sodes of “mass killings” during wars between 1945 and 2000 occurred in civil wars+ See also Easterly,
Gatti, and Kurlat 2006; and Humphreys and Weinstein 2006+
54+ This claim is consistent with the growing literature that attributes much greater domestic audi-
ence costs to democracies than to nondemocratic governments+ See Schultz 2001, 34+
55+ UCDP0PRIO Armed Conﬂict Dataset Codebook 3+10 ~deﬁning conﬂict intensity!+ ~Version
3-2005!, available at ^http:00www+prio+no0CSCW0Datasets0Armed-Conﬂict0UCDP-PRIO0&+ Accessed
8 January 2010+ Appendices to this article are available at ^http:00scholar+iq+harvard+edu0bsimmons0
publications0credible-commitments&, accessed 2 February 2010+ Appendix A lists the countries that
have experienced civil war by this deﬁnition since 1990; Appendix B describes all variables used in
this study+
238 International OrganizationDependent Variable: ICC Commitment
Credible commitment theory is predicated on the tying of one’s hands through
institutional arrangements that make it difﬁcult or costly to reverse a promise+ Often
this is achieved through an irrevocable act of delegation to an authority over which
the government has little control+56 In the case of the ICC, the crucial “tying of
hands” takes place at ratiﬁcation+ Signature is not legally binding; it is only indic-
ative of a state’s willingness to participate in discussions relating to the formation
of the Court and a commitment not to actively undermine the institution+57 We
therefore consider ratiﬁcation ~or accession! to be the most signiﬁcant indicator of
hand-tying relevant to the commitment theory we have outlined here+
Our central expectations are:
Prediction 1: Low credibility states (nondemocracies, low rule-of-law states) that
have recently experienced civil wars are likely to ratify the ICC.
Prediction 2: High credibility states (democracies, high rule-of-law states) that
have recently experienced civil wars are not likely to ratify the ICC.
Prediction 3: High credibility states (democracies, high rule-of-law states) that
have not recently experienced civil wars are likely to ratify the ICC.
The Model: Event History Analysis
Our central purpose is to infer the motives states may have for joining the ICC
from their decisions whether to ratify the Rome Statute+ We use event history analy-
sis to analyze the extent to which both constant and time-varying factors inﬂuence
the probability that a government will ratify the ICC statute in a given quarter,
given that it has not yet done so+58 We have therefore arranged our data quarterly
and delimited the relevant “spell” from the date from which the statute was open
56+ The Rome Statute does allow states parties to withdraw from the Court if they provide one-year
notice+ Rome Statute, Article 127~1!+ The treaty does not, however, release states parties from any
obligation to cooperate with the Court incurred while a member of the Court+ Rome Statute, Article
127~2!+
57+ See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18; and Swaine 2003, 2071+
58+ Speciﬁcally we employ a Cox proportional hazard model, which estimates a “hazard rate”
deﬁned as:
h~t! 
probability of event between times t and t1
~t 1!~probability of event after time t!
where the “event” of interest is ratiﬁcation+ The hazard rate is then modeled as a function of the base-
line hazard ~ho! at time t—which is simply the hazard for an observation with all explanatory variables
set to zero—as well as a number of explanatory variables, the estimates of which indicate proportional
changes relative to this baseline hazard+ The null hypothesis is that the proportionate hazard rate for
any given explanatory variable of interest is 1 ~it has no effect on the baseline hazard rate!+
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court 239for signature to the date of ratiﬁcation+ The results are reported as hazard ratios,
which indicate the proportionate inﬂuence of a given factor on the decision to
ratify+ Numbers greater than one increase the hazard rate of ratiﬁcation; less than
one proportionately reduce the rate+
Results: The Evidence of the ICC as a Mechanism for
Credible Commitment
Ratiﬁcation
Ratiﬁcation patterns of the Rome Statute provide strong support for the credible
commitments theory ~Table 1!+ Democracies with no recent history of civil war
are quite likely to join the ICC+59 We have hypothesized that these countries con-
stitute the Court’s principled supporters who themselves are highly unlikely ever
to ﬁnd their nationals indicted+ Both a dearth of conﬂict as well as credible domes-
tic mechanisms for handling war crimes make this group willing to support the
ICC secure in the knowledge that they will be highly unlikely ever to be subject
to its jurisdiction+ This group is more than two and a half times more likely ~haz-
ard ratio of 2+6, Model 1! to ratify the Rome Statute than are nondemocracies
without recent civil war experience+
What is surprising from some perspectives, but expected by credible commit-
ment theory, is that nondemocracies with recent civil war experience are highly
likely to ratify the Statute quickly+ According to Ratiﬁcation Model 1, nondemo-
cracies with civil wars are nearly three times more likely to ratify ~hazard ratio
of 2+84! than are nondemocracies without recent civil war experience+ Of course,
countries with practically no chance of their nationals appearing before the ICC—
highly accountable governments with no recent history of violent civil conﬂict—
are also very likely to ratify: more than twelve times more likely to do so than
authoritarian regimes who similarly have no civil wars since 1990+
These ﬁndings show that, despite their completely different institutions and expe-
riences, peaceful democracies and civil-strife ridden nondemocracies tend to dis-
play similar ratiﬁcation propensities+ By contrast, democracies with a recent history
of civil war are far less likely to ratify the Rome Statute+ A currently democratic
country that experienced civil war between 1990 and 1997 is about 62 percent
less likely to ratify the Rome Statute than is a nondemocracy without a recent past
of civil violence ~hazard ratio of 0+370, Model 1!+ This ﬁnding supports credible
commitment theory: the least credible but most violence-prone governments have
joined the principled but nonvulnerable governments in ratifying the ICC treaty
most readily+
59+ Note that nondemocracies ~low rule-of-law states! without recent civil war experience is the
excluded category to which all three included democracy ~rule of law!0conﬂict combinations are
compared+
240 International OrganizationCertain null results also support the theory of credible commitments+ First, we
found that these results hold up only for recent civil wars; civil wars in the more
distant past do not seem to affect countries’ calculations about whether or not to
join the Court ~not reported here!+ Since the Court’s jurisdiction is prospective
only, this result is unsurprising+ The further in the past the civil war experience,
the less necessary is the Court’s prospective jurisdiction to the development of
credibility+ We also ﬁnd the results do not hold up for ongoing civil wars, which is
not what one would expect if states are simply using the ICC as a tool against
immediate rebel opponents+
One of the primary alternatives to the ICC as a device for making credible com-
mitments is the claim that governments join the Court not because they want to
self-bind, but because they are trying to deter and to hold others responsible for
their crimes+ One version of this alternative points to the desire to hold future
governments and their agents accountable for war crimes+ Where governments face
a high risk of regime change, they may have incentives to join the ICC to reduce
impunity for future governments+60 There is little evidence for this idea+ Unstable
regimes and transitional regimes were no more likely to ratify the ICC statutes if
they had a recent civil war than were more stable governments+61 Another alterna-
tive argument singles out the incentives governments may have for ratiﬁcation if
they are situated within especially violent regions or neighborhoods+ Surrounded
by the spillovers from other countries’ civil conﬂicts, governments have incen-
tives, this argument goes, to ratify the Court as a way to indict foreign citizens
who commit atrocities in their territories+ The large number of ratiﬁcations in cen-
tral sub-Saharan Africa, for example, could be understood in these terms+ There is
some support for the dangerous neighborhood explanation, but it is not strong+
Model 2, in Table 1, reports the strongest possible evidence we can produce for
this argument+ It suggests that when a country has had two or more civil wars on
its borders within the past ﬁve years, that the government is about 9 percent more
likely to ratify the ICC statutes than when it has had one or fewer ~p  +107!+
But this result is very sensitive to the number of civil wars on the border; it dis-
appears when dividing the data at both one or three or more neighboring civil
wars+ Nor does it hold up when ongoing civil wars are used instead of those of the
past ﬁve years+ Even if concerns about importing others’ atrocities is part of the
answer, the size of the impact of neighboring civil wars is much smaller than
the 2+4-fold increase associated with civil wars within nondemocratic countries+
These ﬁndings are highly robust to alternative explanations, as shown in Mod-
e l s2t o5 + One obvious alternative is that governments with large militaries might
be hesitant to submit to the Court, for two reasons: large militaries provide more
60+ For a similar argument with respect to the European Court for Human rights, see Moravcsik
2000+
61+ Null results were found for the interaction of civil war and the standard deviation of regime
type, as well as for the interaction of civil war and “transitional democracy” status ~ever above 7 on
the 10-point polity scale!+ Results available from authors+
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Explanatory variables
Model 1
(basic)
Model 2
(neighbors’
civil conﬂicts)
Model 3
(torture/amnesty
controls)
Model 4
(alliance, aid,
trade pressure)
Model 5
(socialization
controls)
Model 6
(basic,
conditioned on
polity score)
Model 7
(basic,
conditioned on
rule of law)
democracies1 without recent civil 12+64*** 16+32*** 13+36*** 10+69*** 14+71*** 7+87*** —
wars2 p  0+000 p 0+000 p 0+003 p 0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000
democracies with recent civil wars 0+370** 0+300*** 0+340** 0+359** 0+305*** 0+338*** —
p  0+032 p 0+003 p 0+012 p 0+021 p 0+010 p 0+003
nondemocracies with recent civil 2+83** 3+56*** 3+09*** 3+13*** 3+19*** 2+49**
wars p  0+017 p 0+001 p 0+007 p 0+007 p 0+009 p 0+005 —
rule-of-law3 states without recent —— — — ——2 +62*
civil war p  0+076
rule-of-law states with recent civil —— — — ——0 +349***
war p  0+003
low rule-of-law states with recent —— — — ——2 +70***
civil wars p  0+003
log military personnel 0+720*** 0+700*** 0+740*** 0+726*** 0+673*** 0+617*** 0+688***
p  0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000
log peacekeepers 1+08 1+09* 1+08 1+11** 1+06 1+11* 1+12**
p  0+109 p 0+086 p 0+125 p 0+030 p 0+24 p 0+053 p 0+024
regional ratification 1+01 1+01 1+01 1+008 1+009 0+999 1+009
p  0+357 p 0+369 p 0+383 p 0+510 p 0+410 p 0+946 p 0+416
human rights treaties 1+38*** 1+32*** 1+44*** 1+33*** 1+29*** 1+32*** 1+41***
p  0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000 p 0+010 p 0+008 p 0+004 p 0+001
ongoing extraterritorial conflict 1+07 — — — — — —
p  0+877
constitutional amendment required 0+392*** 0+415*** 0+421*** 0+406*** 0+432*** 0+394*** 0+512**
p  0+002 p 0+004 p 0+003 p 0+002 p 0+004 p 0+003 p 0+031
icc elected officials 2+74*** 3+07*** 3+04*** 3+72*** 2+83*** 2+97*** 3+31***
p  0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000
icc leaders 2+37*** 2+62*** 2+30*** 1+27 2+77*** 2+27*** 2+53***
p  0+003 p 0+001 p 0+005 p 0+521 p 0+000 p 0+008 p 0+002
british legal heritage (common law) 0+590** 0+530*** 0+580** 0+618* 0+500*** 0+567** 0+574**
p  0+026 p 0+005 p 0+020 p 0+068 p 0+003 p 0+018 p 0+022two or more neighbors with civil wars, —1 +09 — — — — —
past five years p  0+107
worst torturers —— 1 +40 — — — —
p  0+517
amnesties for icc crimes —— 1 +05 — — — —
p  0+894
truth commissions —— +792 — — — —
p  0+541
military alliance with u.s. —— — 1 +08 — — —
p  0+697
military alliance with eu —— — 2 +79*** — — —
p  0+001
aid from u.s. —— — 1 +24** — — —
p  0+018
aid from eu —— — +976 — — —
p  0+376
trade with u.s. as share of total —— — 1 +005 — — —
trade p  0+139
trade with eu as share of total —— — 1 +004 — — —
trade p  0+173
log nongovernmental organizations —— — —1 +29** — —
p  0+023
log multilateral suppression —— — —1 +05 — —
treaties p  0+894
Number of countries 189 189 186 169 189 156 187
Number of events 97 100 96 91 100 84 98
Number of observations 3937 5189 4992 4660 5189 3880 4582
Notes: Table employs Cox proportionate hazard models with hazard ratios ~p-values!+
1+ “Democracy” for Models 1 to 5 is coded as free or partially free on the Freedom House scale+ As a robustness check, Model 6 codes a polity score above 0 as “democratic+”
2+ Measure used is civil war of any intensity during the 1990s prior to ﬁnalization of the ICC Treaty, namely 1990–97+
3+ Rule-of-law states score above 1 and low rule-of-law states score below 1 on the World Bank rule-of-law scale+
* signiﬁcant at +10; ** signiﬁcant at +05; ***signiﬁcant at +01+targets for ICC investigations and they also constitute a powerful interest group to
lobby against the institution+ We ﬁnd strong evidence consistent with these expla-
nations+ But we also ﬁnd ~with less certainty! that countries that supply many
peacekeepers tended to ratify more readily+ This likely reﬂects the commitment
some governments have—for reasons we have not theorized here—to participate
in multilateral projects supporting international peace and stability+ For these states,
the ICC is simply another tool in the promotion of global order+62 These two
variables—size of military and contribution to peacekeeping—reveal opposite rat-
iﬁcation tendencies for countries who use their militaries for primarily national
versus primarily collective international purposes+
Alternative theoretical perspectives suggest the inclusion of other factors that
could inﬂuence ratiﬁcation, and we include appropriate indicators to see if they
alter our main conclusions+ Many studies have found that governments are signif-
icantly inﬂuenced by the ratiﬁcations of other countries in their region, whether
because they have similar preferences or because they adopt regional practices in
order to avoid criticism+63 If civil war and democracy cluster regionally, we may
mistakenly have attributed rational commitment-making to a less rational process
of regional emulation+ In the case of the ICC, regional emulation is not a factor+
While other human rights agreements may spark insincere emulation among peers,
ratifying the ICC simply to follow regional norms is potentially risky precisely
because it has teeth+ This null result is highly consistent with the interpretation of
the ICC we are advancing in this article, and a stark contrast with published ﬁnd-
ings for human rights treaties that lack external enforcement+64 Another possibility
is that we have inadvertently confounded support for the ICC with support for
human rights treaties in general+65 The predisposition to ratify human rights trea-
ties is in fact highly correlated with ICC ratiﬁcation, but this result does not dis-
turb the main results about credible commitment-making+
It is also possible that governments ratify the ICC because they believe they
will be able to control it to some extent+ To test for this possibility, we have desig-
nated certain countries “leaders”—those with early involvement in the Court’s
design and with the resources to inﬂuence the direction of events+ We deﬁned “lead-
ers” as the intersection of the “like-minded group” of states, which were commit-
ted to creating a robust and independent Court during the treaty negotiations, and
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ~OECD! membership
~an organization of the wealthiest countries in the world!+ We also coded those
countries whose nationals eventually did get elected to ICC positions, and we use
this as a measure of anticipated inﬂuence over the institution+ These indicators
have moderate to strong effects in the expected direction ~the eventual election of
62+ See Neumayer 2009+
63+ Simmons 2009, chap+ 3+
64+ Ibid+
65+ Some social scientists have analyzed the ICC primarily as though it were a human rights insti-
tution+ See Smith 2004+
244 International Organizationan ofﬁcial to the ICC nearly triples the propensity to ratify: hazard ratios range
from 2+74 to 3+31!, but they have practically no effect on our central ﬁnding on
credible commitment-making+ These ﬁndings further reinforce our view that, among
democracies without recent civil wars ~true for all countries categorized as “lead-
ers”!, the ICC is viewed as an institution that they are creating for others+ The
institution’s most inﬂuential designers do not expect to be prosecuted there, but
they correctly anticipate their ofﬁcials will be elected to the Court, where presum-
ably they may help protect their state’s interests and reafﬁrm their state’s values in
the institution+
Another possibility is that ratiﬁcation patterns may be driven by various domes-
tic hurdles that make cooperation with the ICC institutionally difﬁcult+66 To
capture this possibility, we have collected data for each country on whether or
not a constitutional amendment is required to cooperate with the Court+ Unsur-
prisingly, countries with such constitutional requirements are indeed much less
likely to ratify+ Having such a requirement reduces the likelihood of ratifying
by between 49 and 61 percent, but leaves the credible commitment story well
intact+
Several of the robustness checks in Table 1 returned null results+ We found no
impact of ongoing extraterritorial conﬂict, which we included because we did not
want our results to be driven by several countries’ contemporaneous involvement
in Iraq and Afghanistan+ We included a series of other indicators of atrocities, such
as widespread torture, amnesty for ICC crimes, and the use of truth commissions,
but none of these affect the results ~Model 3!+ We also considered the possibility
that political relationships with members of the Europe Union ~mostly in favor of
the ICC! and the United States ~vehemently opposed! might inﬂuence countries’
ratiﬁcation decisions ~Model 4!+ There is evidence that military alliance with Europe
increases the likelihood of ratifying,67 but contrary to expectations, so does for-
eign aid assistance from the United States+ We found some evidence that the con-
clusion of so-called Article 98 Agreements with the United States—bilateral
agreements not to cooperate with the Court in prosecuting one another’s nationals—
has positively inﬂuenced the decision of countries to ratify, although the direction
of causation is unclear since the United States is more likely to want a mutual
nonsurrender agreement with a party to the ICC, ceteris paribus, than a non-
party+68 The concentrated presence of pro-ICC nongovernmental organizations
~NGOs! as well as ICC-related conferences ~not reported!, may increase the chances
of ratiﬁcation, but participation in networks of multilateral treaties that include
66+ For an example of the domestic constitutional hurdles that produced delay in ratiﬁcation, see
the case of Japan described by Meierhenrich and Ko 2009+
67+ Military alliance with Europe is robust with the inclusion of Western and Eastern European
dummy variables ~either is statistically signiﬁcant!, so this is not simply a NATO effect+
68+ Inclusion of an indicator for an Article 98 Agreement with the United States in the basic model
approximately doubled the probability of ratifying the ICC ~p  +049!; results available from authors
on request, but had no effect on the central results+
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socialization is mixed, it does not disturb our conclusion about the importance of
credible commitment-making to explain ICC statute ratiﬁcation+
Finally, we check for the robustness of our measure of “accountability+” Our
theoretical claim hinges on the idea that polities that are not equipped credibly to
hold individuals—including government ofﬁcials and agents—responsible for war
crimes are most likely to turn to the ICC to tie these ofﬁcials’ hands+ We get sim-
ilar results when we use the polity scale to measure accountability ~diving that
scale at zero!; see Model 6+ Moreover, weak “rule of law” countries should be
especially willing in this perspective to engage the Court if the primary motive is
to make a credible commitment to foreswear atrocities+ Model 7 conﬁrms this expec-
tation quite strongly+ The countries with the weakest rule of law ~below 1o nt h e
World Bank’s scale; see Data Appendix! and a violent recent past were as or more
likely to ratify the ICC statutes than high rule-of-law countries without recent civil
wars+ Countries with the internal institutions better able credibly to prosecute and
with a recent history of civil violence were 65 percent less likely to ratify ~hazard
ratio of 0+349! than low rule-of-law countries without civil wars, and far less likely
to ratify than countries with a weak rule of law and a recent civil war ~hazard
ratio of 2+7!+
Overall, the evidence that states are motivated to ratify the Rome Statute in order
to enhance their ability to make a credible commitment to refrain from atrocities
in the future is consistently supported by the ratiﬁcation evidence+ Furthermore,
these ﬁndings are consistent with results reported elsewhere that nondemocracies
experiencing civil war in the recent past are also more likely actually to imple-
ment statutes to cooperate with the ICC as well+70 Many states seem to behave as
though they have a motive to tie their hands through ICC jurisdiction+ If this is in
fact the case, we might also expect an ICC commitment to inﬂuence the prospects
for peace—a proposition we explore in the following subsection+
The Credibility of the Commitment: Hand-Tying and the
Possibilities for Peace
The fact that nondemocracies and low rule-of-law countries with recent civil wars
tend to be among the most likely to ratify the Rome Statute provides evidence of
behavior consistent with credible commitment theory+ But how is this behavior
interpreted by the various audiences these governments may be trying to inﬂu-
ence? One answer is “suspiciously”—which would be consistent with the view
that the Court is more about strategically targeting one’s domestic enemies rather
than self-binding+ While governments make the formal legal commitment to an
69+ All of these variables are deﬁned in Appendix B+ Available at ^http:00scholar+iq+harvard+edu0
bsimmons0publications0credible-commitments&, accessed 2 February 2010+
70+ Danner and Simmons 2006+
246 International Organizationinternational audience, the credible commitment theory we have developed relies
principally on committing to a domestic audience, including one’s political oppo-
nents, that the government is serious about de-escalating the conﬂict+ But is this
commitment understood as meaningful?
Obviously, credibility is impossible to observe+ But we can assess the impact of
ICC ratiﬁcation on the presumed behavioral consequences of credible commitment-
making+ If the ICC really does help governments make credible commitments to
their political opponents, ratiﬁcation should, ceteris paribus, increase the likeli-
hood of peace+ The act of hands-tying should raise the ex post costs of committing
atrocities by both government and opponents, providing space for a truce, trust
building, and eventually a negotiated settlement+ At least this is the hope of many
who view the Court as an institution that can contribute to justice and stability+
Credible commitment theory predicts that the ICC can enhance movements
toward peaceful settlement within those countries with credibility deﬁcits+ To test
this idea, we begin with a simple model of civil war hiatus+ We model the impact
of the ICC on the propensity to terminate civil war hostilities, using the same
event history strategy employed above+ Table 2 reports the impact of ratiﬁcation
on episodes of civil war termination ~deﬁned as a one-year cessation in hostilities!
between 1998 and 2007+ Three different measures are used to capture accountabil-
ity+ ~Unfortunately, colinearity problems in this subset of cases prevented use of
the Freedom House measure+! Model 1 divides cases using the polity scale; Model 2
uses the World Bank’s “rule of law” measure, and Model 3 taps accountability
with a measure of political constraints on the executive power+ Highly constrained
executives are accountable to a legislature, opposition political parties, and the
judiciary—all the more so when these actors have heterogeneous preferences and
a will to inﬂuence and control the decisions of the executive+ Credible commit-
ment theory would suggest a greater impact of ICC ratiﬁcation on peacemaking in
countries where the executive is less constrained, and therefore institutionally less
able to commit to a policy to which independent governing actors might hold him
or her+
The results are largely consistent with our theoretical expectations+ In all speci-
ﬁcations, the governments with the weakest domestic accountability mechanisms
that have ratiﬁed the Rome Statute are more likely to experience at least a lull in
violent hostilities following ratiﬁcation compared to the least accountable govern-
ments that have not ratiﬁed+ Using both the polity scale and our measure of con-
straints on the executive, the effects of ratiﬁcation on civil war termination are
statistically signiﬁcant+71 Model 1 estimates that the least democratic governments
as measured by the polity scale are almost eight times more likely to terminate a
71+ When the unit of analysis is conﬂict episode ~allowing for multiple simultaneous conﬂicts and
the reopening of conﬂicts after they have been terminated for a year! rule of law also supports our
hypothesis+ Counting conﬂicts in this way, ratiﬁcation among the lowest rule-of-law countries increased
the probability of civil conﬂict termination ﬁve fold, but had no effect in cases scoring above 1o n
the rule-of-law scale+ Results available from author+
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court 247violent conﬂict if they have ratiﬁed the ICC statutes ~hazard ratio of 7+84! than if
they have not+ According to Model 3, among the least constrained executives rat-
iﬁcation is associated with more than a nine-and-a-half-fold increase in the prob-
ability of war termination+ Finally, just as the theory anticipates, ratiﬁcation has
little independent effect on peace where domestic institutions arguably provide
reasonable assurances of government accountability+
These results are suggestive that ratiﬁcation signals a domestic adversary that a
government wants to ratchet down the level of violence, and is willing to tie its
hands in that regard+ We do not claim, of course, that the ICC is solely or even
primarily responsible for hastening a cessation of civil war hostilities in most cases+
Unsurprisingly, conﬂict intensity decreases the likelihood of cessation, as do in
this case domestic efforts at “reconciliation” such as truth commissions, at least in
Model 1+ Other controls—the country’s military power, whether the government
was headed by a military ofﬁcer, the radius of the conﬂict, various measures of
external aid—had no discernable effect+ Table 2 suggests we can be cautiously
conﬁdent that governments with low levels of “inherent” credibility that have rat-
iﬁed the ICC are more likely to experience at least a year’s gap in their civil war
violence than those that have not+
We also test whether ICC ratiﬁcation leads to efforts to reach a more durable
peace arrangement in civil war situations+ And we can bolster our ability to draw
inferences about ICC ratiﬁcation by using a two-stage model that endogenizes the
decision to ratify itself+ That is, we can ask what is the effect of ratifying the
Rome Statute on the probability of reaching a peace accord, controlling for
the factors associated with ratifying the ICC in the ﬁrst place? Using an instru-
mental probit model ~described below!, inferences about the value of the costly
commitment per se can be isolated in a more precise fashion+
In order to identify such a model, we use instruments that predict ratiﬁcation,
but that in themselves do not increase the likelihood of reaching a civil peace
accord+ The previous tests revealed the importance of constitutional barriers to
ratiﬁcation ~the need for amendment!, a civil law legal tradition, and the signing
of international human rights treaties as strong predictors of ICC ratiﬁcation+ Yet
there is no strong theoretical reason to expect these conditions to lead to peace
accords in a domestic civil war+72 We therefore use these as instruments in a two-
stage instrumental variable probit model ~controlling for time dependence with a
counting vector and cubic splines for both peace accords and ratiﬁcation in the
second stage equation!+ As in Table 2, for clarity and comparison, we have divided
72+ Nor are these measures good empirical predictors of the conclusion of peace agreements+ The
results of a probit model with peace agreement as a dependent variable ~pseudo R2  0+0091! and
these instruments as explanatory variables indicate they are not likely correlated with the outcome+ For
the variable constitutional amendment, the coefﬁcient is 0+249, with standard error of 0+386
and P . 6z6 of 0+519; for ratification, the coefﬁcient is 0+045, with standard error of 0+081 and
P . 6z6 of 0+578; for british legal heritage ~common law!, the coefﬁcient is 0+150, with standard
error of 0+209 and P . 6z6 of 0+472; and for log of military personnel, the coefﬁcient is 0+013,
with standard error of 0+043 and P . 6z6 of 0+762+
248 International OrganizationTABLE 2. Effect of ICC ratiﬁcation on civil war termination
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Explanatory variables Polity . 0 Polity , 1
WB rule
of law . 1
WB rule
of law , 1
Political
constraints . 0
Political
constraints  0
ratification 1+000 7+84** 1+00 1+96 1+00 9+51*
p  0+853 p 0+047 p 0+998 p 0+344 p 0+995 p 0+083
conflict intensity 1+05 0+134*** 0+538 0+262** 0+631 0+143***
p  0+909 p 0+000 p 0+120 p 0+012 p 0+195 p 0+005
truth commission 0+651 0+204** 0+278** 0+762 0+633 0+211**
p  0+366 p 0+043 p 0+041 p 0+724 p 0+335 p 0+024
country’s military power 0+005 0+000 36+15 0+000 0+000 0+000
p  0+745 p 0+125 p 0+856 p 0+281 p 0+421 p 0+871
log of military personnel 0+862 0+513 0+770 1+31 0+974 0+647
p  0+401 p 0+246 p 0+110 p 0+601 p 0+873 p 0+518
executive a military officer 0+062* 1+07 1+57 1+07 0+613 1+30
p  0+078 p 0+918 p 0+535 p 0+906 p 0+523 p 0+734
total aid/gdp 1+07** 0+996 1+02 0+996 1+01 1+00
p  0+021 p 0+912 p 0+572 p 0+854 p 0+626 p 0+938
military alliance with the 0+784 0+468 1+80 0+820 1+02 —
u.s. or european country p  0+799 p 0+644 p 0+582 p 0+872 p 0+974
Number of countries (or episodes) 24 28 25 23 31 19
Number of events 18 16 19 15 23 11
Number of observations 412 376 423 365 523 265
Notes: Table employs Cox proportionate hazard model+ Dependent variable is probability of civil war termination, 1998–2007 ~ﬁrst termination episode only!+ It was not possible to
analyze the effect of ratiﬁcation for countries scoring 0 on the Freedom House scale, due to colinearity with ratiﬁcation for this group+ WB  World Bank+* signiﬁcant at +10;
** signiﬁcant at +05; *** signiﬁcant at +01+the sample of civil war countries into democracies versus nondemocracies, high
versus low rule-of-law states and constrained versus unconstrained executives+ The
results are reported in Table 3+
The results of these tests are unambiguous and remarkably consistent with cred-
ible commitment theory+ In every model, ICC ratiﬁcation among the least account-
able governments has a signiﬁcant positive effect on the probability that a peace
agreement will be reached in a country plagued by a recent or ongoing civil war+
However, ratifying the ICC does not clearly have an independent effect on the
prospects for peace in high rule-of-law states or states in which the chief execu-
tive is highly constrained by domestic governing institutions+ There does seem to
be a strong positive effect in countries that are democratic ~rated as “free” by Free-
dom House!, but it is telling that the positive coefﬁcient is much smaller than that
estimated for countries that are “not free+” The hands-tying function of the ICC
makes a difference primarily in those countries least able to make credible com-
mitments on their own+ As expected, ratiﬁcation does not add much on the margin
to the peacemaking process in countries that already have reasonably strong
accountability mechanisms in place+ Moreover, exactly as we should expect if rat-
iﬁcation beneﬁts ﬂow from hands-tying, there is not much peace-making advan-
tage to signature alone+ Every model controls for the impact of having signed the
ICC statutes, indicating an “intent” to cooperate with that institution+ Expressing
only an “intent” to cooperate with the ICC does not contribute at all to the prob-
ability that a low rule-of-law state will enter into a peace agreement with its civil
adversaries+ This is strong evidence indeed of the usefulness of using legally bind-
ing arrangements to achieve outcomes that both parties—governments and domes-
tic adversaries—may wish to achieve+
Ratiﬁcation of the ICC positively impacts the probability of peace accords con-
trolling for an array of other factors+ One of these is whether the executive is a mil-
itary ofﬁcer or civilian+ Military leaders are positively associated with peace accords
only in one speciﬁcation ~in low rule-of-law cases!, but never in democratic, high
rule-of-law polities and constrained governments ~where they are exceedingly rare!+
What does seem to matter is the intensity of the conﬂict itself+ Where the account-
ability of the government was highest, higher intensity conﬂicts were always asso-
ciated with a greater likelihood that a peace accord would be reached—a result that
does not hold for the least accountable governments+Apparently, the more account-
able the government, the greater the desire and presumably the more intense the pres-
sure to end high-intensity violent civil conﬂict+ Foreign aid seems to be associated
with a reduction in the probability of reaching a peace settlement, especially when
less accountable governments are involved+ Of course, this analysis does not include
selection effects—donors may choose to provide aid in precisely the most difﬁcult-
to-solve cases; examples as diverse as Israel and Somalia illustrate the point+
Finally, we might be wrong in assuming that nonaccountable governments can-
not make credible commitments domestically to refrain from atrocities+ Perhaps
less accountable governments can pass domestic rules that their opponents interpret
as credible hand-tying+ We test for this possibility by exploiting data we have coded
250 International OrganizationTABLE 3. Effect of ICC ratiﬁcation on peace agreements 1998–2007
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Explanatory variables
Democracies
(FH . 0)
Nondemocracies
(FH  0)
High rule-of-
law states
(WB . 1)
Low rule-of-
law states
(WB , 1)
More constrained executives
(political constraints . 0)
Less constrained executives
(political constraints  0)
ratification 3+445* 5+2*** 3+304 3+89*** 2+426 4+31***
p  0+051 p 0+000 p 0+299 p 0+000 p 0+736 p 0+003
signature 0+293 0+0995 0+201 0+198 0+064 0+367
p  0+298 p 0+528 p 0+662 p 0+411 p 0+94 p 0+469
intensity of conflict 0+237* 0+015 0+293* 0+041 0+404*** 0+088
p  0+061 p 0+927 p 0+073 p 0+801 p 0+006 p 0+661
size of state’s military (personnel) 0+041 0+034 0+011 0+002 0+002 0+007
p  0+368 p 0+643 p 0+859 p 0+97 p 0+983 p 0+944
executive a military officer 0+194 0+061 0+122 0+262* 0+226 0+041
p  0+377 p 0+699 p 0+688 p 0+074 p 0+588 p 0+800
total aid/gdp 0+006 0+050*** 0+018 0+026*** 0+023 0+025***
p  0+481 p 0+001 p 0+223 p 0+001 p 0+411 p 0+006
criminal statutes 0+106 0+188 0+013 0+5** 0+03 0+116
p  0+655 p 0+359 p 0+966 p 0+018 p 0+956 p 0+557
Constant 2+25*** 2+69*** 2+34*** 2+18*** 1+83 2+34***
p  0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000 p 0+000 p 0+102 p 0+000
Number of observations 1488 881 1662 704 1587 782
Notes: Instrumental variable probit estimation, with icc ratification instrumented+ Robust standard errors ~clustered on country!+ Instrumented  ICC ratiﬁcation+ Instruments
 whether a constitutional amendment is required for ratiﬁcation, number of human rights treaties ratiﬁed, British common law system, counting vectors and cubic splines for
ratiﬁcation and peace agreements, plus all variables reported above+ WB  World Bank+ * signiﬁcant at +10; ** signiﬁcant at +05; *** signiﬁcant at +01+on whether or not governments have changed their domestic criminal statutes—
unilaterally, with or without ratiﬁcation of the ICC—by making ICC crimes a part
of the domestic criminal code+73 If nondemocratic countries are in fact able to
convince their domestic opponents that they will refrain from atrocities using only
domestic sources of enforcement, we should ﬁnd a positive impact to such changes
in domestic law analogous to the ICC commitment itself+
As it turns out, there is no evidentiary basis for revising our assumption about
nonaccountable governments+ Quite the contrary: changing the domestic criminal
statutes to match the obligations contained in the ICC ~which we code as having
imported “crimes against humanity” as a crime prosecutable in domestic courts!
has, if anything, a negative impact on the prospects for peace accords, especially
in less accountable countries+ Outlawing crimes against humanity in domestic law
is hardly a useful option in these cases+74
Conclusion
This article addresses a puzzle in international relations of the ﬁrst order—namely,
why states would voluntarily delegate an essential sovereign function to an inter-
national institution over which they have little political control? A surprising num-
ber of adherents have had serious problems with violent internal conﬂict, yet are
unable to deal with the worst atrocities in a way that inspires trust from domestic
groups or the international community+ One way to think about the delegation issue
is through the lens of theories of credible commitment-making+ This approach pre-
dicts that states that are at risk for committing the kinds of atrocities governed by
the Court but that lack a dependable domestic mechanism for holding government
agents accountable are likely to be among the Court’s earliest and most avid
subscribers+
The evidence for this interpretation of delegation received strong support in our
empirical analysis+ Despite exhaustive robustness tests taking alternative mea-
sures and explanations into account, we found fairly consistently that the least
accountable governments—the least democratic, with the weakest reputations for
respecting the rule of law, the least politically constrained—with a recent past of
civil violence were at the highest “risk” of ratifying the Rome Statute+ Along with
countries whose nationals were least likely ever to be vulnerable to the Court’s
jurisdiction ~and for whom sovereignty costs were therefore likely to be very low!,
the least credible but most vulnerable governments were found to be among the
73+ For this criminal legislation, we coded whether the country’s penal code contained a provision
penalizing “crimes against humanity+” Since countries that had not ratiﬁed the Rome Statute might
also decide to change their criminal code ~perhaps to preempt ICC jurisdiction!, and because states
parties are not legally obligated to do so, we model the decision of any state ~not just ratiﬁers! to
change its criminal code in this way+
74+ On the problems associated with ﬂawed implementation of ICC criminal standards in domestic
law, see Bacio Terracino 2007+
252 International Organizationearliest ratiﬁers+ The characteristics associated with a need to make a credible com-
mitment to forswear atrocity as an instrument of war-ﬁghting were consistently
associated with high rates of cooperation with the ICC+
One innovation of this research is that it has examined not only the commit-
ment decision, but the observable implications of this decision for incipient pro-
cesses of peacemaking+ This is a crucial step, because the Court has been derided
repeatedly—and with little systematic evidence—as either disruptive or irrelevant
to its purported raison d’être: support of international peace and stability+ We have
found evidence that for states unable to make credible promises to scale down the
violence, ICC ratiﬁcation is associated with tentative steps toward peacemaking+
Our ﬁndings in all three cases—explaining ratiﬁcation, civil war hiatus0termination,
and peace accords—converge on a possible motive for delegation: the strong desire
of some states to establish their credibility with a domestic audience to ﬁght fair+
This article also carefully considered a number of plausible alternative explana-
tions+ Some were clearly found wanting+ The idea that ratiﬁcation is purely sym-
bolic does not square with the facts+ We have argued that this is an institution with
the power to put real people in prison for most of their lives+ Symbolism alone
does not explain this decision, especially when one of the world’s major powers,
the United States, offers a powerful alternative symbol to justify nonratiﬁcation:
state sovereignty over prosecution+ The ICC is not the obvious place to engage in
purely symbolic gestures; governments have plenty of opportunities to make sym-
bolic gestures in international law by ratifying the numerous treaties devoid of
external enforcement provisions+ Indeed, the absence of any regional emulation in
making the ratiﬁcation decision stands in stark contrast to the empirical ﬁndings
relating to a broad range of human rights treaties that do lack external enforce-
ment provisions+ Nor can states’ cooperation with the ICC be understood as sim-
ply trying to hold others accountable+ We have explained how the prosecutor is
authorized to investigate situations, not particular individuals; states therefore can-
not escape the risk that their agents will come under scrutiny and could be pros-
ecuted+ And our null ﬁnding with respect to ongoing civil wars does not support
an immediate strategy of using the Court to prosecute rebels+ The desire to pros-
ecute dangerous neighbors is a possibility, but we found this effect to be small
compared to a civil war in a state’s recent past+ Even the evidence that ratiﬁcation
is associated with conditions likely to bind a future government was weak+ It is
hard to escape the conclusion that self-binding plays a signiﬁcant role in under-
standing why states have become a party to the ICC+
It is important to emphasize what this research does not show+ We have not
shown that the ICC will in fact deter all or even most atrocities in the future+75 We
cannot claim—as no one can at this point in history—that the ICC will contribute
to permanent peace among factions that have been locked in civil war for years+
75+ Existing research emphasizes the idiosyncratic nature of speciﬁc cases rather than general trends
that might reveal how the Court can be expected to operate+ See, for example, Alexander 200802009+
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court 253Nor do we claim credible commitment-making is the only motive at work+ Ratiﬁ-
cation was shown to be inﬂuenced by the nature of domestic legal systems and to
be signiﬁcantly less likely in states with a large military+ There is ample room to
theorize the perceived appropriateness of joining the ICC from the perspective of
agents operating in common law versus civil law settings,76 constitutional barri-
ers, and the importance of the military as a domestic interest group as additional
explanations for engagement ~or not! with the ICC+ Yet throughout, we found con-
vincing evidence that governments least able credibly to prosecute war-related atroc-
ities were among those most likely to embrace the new international criminal law
regime, as well as behavioral evidence that this commitment meant something to
domestic adversaries+ This ﬁnding is consistent with a new stream of legal research
that explores the signiﬁcance of international law and institutions to bind govern-
ments’ hands in ways that allow them to achieve results that would not be pos-
sible in the absence of international legal institutions+77
Finally, we do not claim that the Rome Statute’s most signiﬁcant legacy will
necessarily ultimately lie in the credibility mechanism we have described+78 It is
important to remember that this mechanism applies to only a small ~but impor-
tant! subset of states+ Whether in the long run the combined effects of external
hands-tying and the domestic changes the Court is precipitating will in fact reduce
the commission of mass crimes and support peace will ultimately be the best test
of the contribution of the ICC to justice and stability+
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